J. J. O’Kelly, Brian O’Higgins and Sinn Féin’s Suppressed Tradition: Part 1

1904-1923: From Strategy to Doctrine and into Practice

Irish Republicanism did not begin with Sinn Féin, nor did Sinn Féin initially speak in its language. By the time the party was founded, a Republican tradition already existed, organised most coherently through the Irish Republican Brotherhood and rooted in an older lineage of separatist thought. Sinn Féin entered this landscape not as the originator of Republican doctrine, but as a strategic experiment – an attempt to recover Irish autonomy by means other than insurrection, without conceding the principle of national self-government.

Arthur Griffith’s pamphlet, The Resurrection of Hungary, articulated this strategy in its clearest early form. Drawing on the Austro-Hungarian precedent, Griffith proposed a policy of Irish self-assertion through abstention from Westminster and the establishment of national institutions in Dublin, under a dual monarchy. The scheme was not republican in form, but it was confrontational in its implication. 

It rested on the assumption that Ireland possessed a political personality capable of acting independently of British permission. The proposed constitutional form was conservative, but the underlying claim wasn’t necessarily.

The Sinn Féin organisation founded in 1905 adopted this dual-monarchist framework. It sought an Irish legislature and government, not through rebellion but through withdrawal from British political structures and the reconstruction of national self-determination from below. 

At this stage, Republicanism was neither the party’s doctrine nor its explicit aim. Yet the movement’s practical logic, namely abstention from British political structures, non-recognition and the assertion of Irish political autonomy as a matter of right, created a space in which Republican ideas could later be systemised.

That formalisation occurred not gradually but abruptly. The revolutionary period of 1916-1919 transformed Sinn Féin from a strategic movement into the principal political expression of Irish Republicanism. 

The declaration of the Republic, the subsequent change in public sentiment, the establishment of the First Dáil and the Tan War reoriented Sinn Féin decisively. Republicanism ceased to be merely one current among others and became the party’s defining feature. Sovereignty was no longer implicit or tactical, it was asserted outright.

Crucially, the Republicanism Sinn Féin adopted during this period was not understood as a matter of electoral mandate alone. The Dáil did not present itself as a novel invention arising from consent in an abstract sense, but as the reconstitution of a lawful authority denied expression by force. Legitimacy, in this understanding, preceded recognition. 

Participation in British institutions was rejected not simply because it was ineffective, but because it was taken to imply acceptance of foreign rule which Republicans opposed.

The Treaty compromise shattered this conception. Its defenders justified acceptance in the language of necessity and exhaustion, presenting compromise as a stage on the road to eventual sovereignty. Its opponents rejected not only the terms of the settlement, but the logic by which authority was said to flow from expedience. 

The subsequent Civil War was therefore not only a contest over power, but a dispute over whether the Republican title could survive partial recognition without being altered in substance.

 By the time the conflict effectively ended in 1923, with the “Dump Arms” order bringing organised resistance to a close, the Republican Movement confronted a problem more severe than a collapse in military capacity. The Free State possessed a state apparatus, enforcement and international recognition. What it did not possess, in the eyes of its opponents, was continuity with the Irish Republic. The question was no longer whether independence could be achieved, but whether Republican standing could be preserved without adapting itself to the structures that had displaced it.

From this point, Sinn Féin existed not as an organisation advancing toward power, but as a custodian of a contested inheritance. The years that followed would test whether the Republicanism it had adopted could be maintained without being redefined or whether, under the pressure of political reality, its meaning would be altered in order to survive.

It is with that question, posed by the loss of effective power rather than by theory, that the real argument begins.

1923-1926: Custodianship After the Dump Arms Order

The effective end of the Civil War did not resolve the Republican question, it displaced it. With armed resistance put on hold in May 1923, the Republican Movement was forced into a role it had never sought: the preservation of an entitlement without the means to materially advance it. What followed was not a period of dormancy, but of reorientation. Republicanism, deprived of force and office alike, was compelled to clarify what it still asserted and on what grounds.

In the immediate post-war years, Sinn Féin did not behave as a party awaiting electoral opportunity. It neither accepted the claimed validity of the Free State nor attempted to compete within its framework. Abstentionism, retained as a principle rather than a tactic, functioned as a refusal of recognition. To enter the Free State parliament was to acknowledge its claim to rule. Refusal to enter it was therefore not obstruction, but denial.

At the centre of this posture lay the unresolved status of the Second Dáil. For Anti-Treaty Republicans, it represented the last body constituted under the authority of the Republic proclaimed in 1916 and asserted by Dáil Éireann in 1919. No subsequent institution, they argued, possessed the competence or the right to dissolve it or supersede its standing. Facing setbacks in war had removed its power, but not its ultimate standing. Authority, in this context, was not extinguished by neglect nor was it transferred by exhaustion.

It was during this period that John J. O’Kelly, Mary MacSwiney, Michael O’Flanagan and Brian O’Higgins, among others, emerged as articulate defenders of this custodial Republicanism. In formal terms, O’Kelly assumed the presidency of Sinn Féin following Éamon de Valera’s departure in 1926, while MacSwiney served as vice-president, became the most uncompromising public voice of the abstentionist position. 

O’Flanagan brought to the same current a distinctive combination of clerical moral weight as well as his socialist conviction, grounding the party not only in moral principle but in a conception of social justice as well. O’Higgins, was to give the tradition a more systematic and codified expression. Though oftentimes differing sharply in temperament, social outlook and emphasis, they were united by the conviction that Republican standing could not be preserved by accommodating itself to a constitutional settlement that it denied.

O’Kelly was not a mass organiser or a charismatic leader. His influence lay instead primarily in his insistence that Republicanism was a matter of seriousness, not of manoeuvre. Politics, as he understood it – as well as MacSwiney and O’Flanagan, from very different starting points, broadly shared – was not a neutral arena where principles could be suspended for advantage. It was a moral field in which conduct either preserved meaning or totally corrupted it. Abstentionism, as understood by this group, was not merely a line of policy but a discipline that demanded restraint from Republicans themselves.

The seriousness with which figures such as John J. O’Kelly and Mary MacSwiney approached Republican doctrine as inseparable from their broader moral and cultural outlook that was explicitly Catholic and deliberately traditional.

For both, politics was not just an area governed by strategy or skill, but a domain answerable to moral order. O’Kelly’s hostility to constitutional arrangements that appeared to dilute Republican principle was matched by his broader suspicion of liberal modernity, whether expressed in secular nationalism, internationalist ideology or forms of politics detached from religious obligation. He was recorded to have admiration for Daniel O’Connell which reflected a view that political authority was legitimate only when exercised in conformity with moral law and the claims of faith.

In O’Kelly’s case, this outlook also manifested itself in polemical positions that reflected many anti-liberal currents of Catholic thought prevalent in parts of Europe during the interwar period. He was openly hostile to Freemasonry, which he regarded as an anti-Catholic force bound up with British influence. He also expressed views about Jewish political, economic and cultural power that were common in certain milieus of the time. These positions, which he articulated forcefully through editorial work and to a lesser extent through formal political programmes, were not incidental to his worldview. They reflected a conception of politics as inseparable from spiritual conflict, in which the defence of national sovereignty, religion and moral order formed a single, indivisible struggle.

MacSwiney’s trajectory, though distinct, shared the same underlying disposition. Her commitment to education, language revival and the formation of youth through institutions such as Scoil Íte placed cultural transmission at the centre of national struggle. While she had engaged with questions of women’s political participation, she rejected militancy divorced from national purpose and subordinated questions of reform to the preservation of Ireland’s spiritual and cultural inheritance. In both cases, abstentionism functioned not only as a political refusal, but as an extension of a wider moral discipline that resisted the fragmentation of belief, culture and authority characteristic of the modern state.

Sinn Féin’s custodial posture was not without tension. Sinn Féin in the mid-1920s contained figures who regarded abstentionism as a temporary expedient rather than a constitutive principle. For them, the Free State was an institution to be navigated rather than a settlement to be repudiated. Participation, in their eyes, could be justified as a means to an end, symbols discounted as secondary to outcomes. The question was not whether legitimacy had been compromised, but whether it could be recovered through success.

Against this logic, the abstentionist cohort was united. Whether expressed in MacSwiney’s absolutism, O’Flanagan’s fusion of national and social justice, O’Kelly’s procedural severity or in O’Higgins’ concern with doctrinal clarity, the answer was the same. Legitimacy was not something that could be lost and regained, it was either preserved or abandoned. To treat participation as neutral was to misunderstand its implications. The Free State’s political structures did not merely constrain action, they also expressed claims to rule. To act within them was to validate them.

1926: The Free State Consolidates

By 1926, the absolutist posture Sinn Féin had adopted after the Civil War could no longer be sustained as an unspoken consensus. The Free State had consolidated itself, electoral politics had resumed their normal rhythms and abstentionism, once assumed, now required explicit reaffirmation. What had previously been a shared refusal became a point of division. The question confronting Sinn Féin was no longer whether Republican legitimacy persisted, but whether it could be acted upon without being significantly altered.

It was at this juncture that Éamon de Valera forced the issue. De Valera suggested that he did not deny the Republican assertion in principle, nor did he repudiate abstentionism outright. Instead, he sought to redefine Republicanism’s substance. Participation in Leinster House, he argued, does not need to imply recognition of the Free State’s credibility. The oath could be treated as just an uncomfortable step rather than as an affirmation. Entry into the institutions of the Free State was presented not as acceptance, but as a means of eventual transformation of their nature.

This argument rested on a crucial assumption: that participation could be rendered morally neutral or even positively by intent. Symbols, in this view, did not carry intrinsic meaning but instead they derived their significance from the purposes for which they were used. To take a seat in Leinster House was not necessarily to affirm its validity, provided the end pursued was broadly Republican in character. Power, once secured, could be used to dismantle the very framework from within.

For O’Kelly and the rest of the abstentionist leadership, this logic was unacceptable. It did not merely propose a change of tactics, it altered the whole content of Republicanism itself. Participation, they insisted, was not neutral. Institutions were not empty vessels awaiting capture but they embodied claims of jurisdiction. To act within them was to affirm, however reluctantly, their claim to command obedience. Intent could not erase implication.

The disagreement, therefore, was not between idealism and realism, nor between purity and pragmatism. It was a dispute over whether legitimacy could be managed or not. De Valera treated Republican doctrine as something that could be deferred, diluted and later recovered through success. The abstentionists treated it as indivisible. Once conceded, even provisionally, it could not be restored without altering its substance.

At the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis of 1926, this difference was exposed in full. When de Valera’s proposal to enter Leinster House was rejected, he resigned the presidency and departed with the bulk of the party’s organisational strength. What followed was not merely a split of personnel, but also a separation of traditions. One current chose to adapt Republican language to what it perceived as the realities of power, the other chose to preserve the terms of Republicanism at the cost of influence.

The formation of Fianna Fáil formalised this divergence. De Valera’s new party did not present itself as a repudiation of Republicanism, but as its continuation by other means. Yet in doing so, it accepted a premise the abstentionists rejected outright, that Ireland’s ultimate authority could flow from effectiveness, mandate and institutional control, rather than from succession with an inherited rightful command.

For O’Kelly and his colleagues, this was not a lesser Republicanism but it was a different one. Republicanism redefined to accommodate participation ceased to function as a doctrine of legitimacy and became instead a language of aspiration. What survived was not the claim itself, but just its vocabulary.

The abstentionist rump that remained after 1926 was smaller, poorer and politically marginal. But it was also clearer about what it refused to concede. Abstentionism, having failed to prevent the split, now became an explicit test of fidelity. It separated those for whom Republicanism described a goal from those for whom it named a condition.

In this sense, 1926 was not the moment that Republicanism fractured under pressure. It was the moment its internal contradictions were resolved, not by compromise but by division. What emerged were two incompatible understandings of political action, one that treated institutions as instruments to be mastered and used to further the objectives of a cause that the state was set up to oppose while the other treated them as expressions of authority to be either accepted in full or rejected entirely.

The consequences of this choice would define the trajectory of Irish politics for the decades to come. For the abstentionists, the task ahead was no longer to prevent redefinition, but to give their refusal a durable form. The years that followed would see that refusal hardened, narrowed and systematised as a deliberate attempt to preserve substance in an environment becoming increasingly hostile to it.