Differences in polling among Ireland’s three major polling agencies are often treated as small methodological differences producing slightly different snapshots of the same electorate. Recent evidence suggests otherwise.
The latest national surveys from Ipsos, Red C, and Ireland Thinks do not merely disagree at the edges; they present markedly different portraits of the political landscape. The divergence is now too consistent to dismiss as noise.
The most recent vote-intention figures are set out below:
Table 1: Three Most Recent National Polls (Vote Intention %)
| Party | Ipsos | Ireland Thinks | Red C |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sinn Féin | 24 | 20 | 24 |
| Fianna Fáil | 19 | 18 | 15 |
| Fine Gael | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Social Democrats | 7 | 10 | 10 |
| Labour | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Aontú | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Independent Ireland | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| Greens | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| PBP–Solidarity | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Independents / Others | 16 | 11 | 14 |
The divergence is not subtle.
Both Red C and Ireland Thinks place the Social Democrats at 10 per cent; Ipsos records them at 7. Aontú reaches 5 or 6 per cent in the non-Ipsos polls, but only 3 per cent in Ipsos. PBP–Solidarity stands at 3–4 per cent elsewhere and 2 per cent in Ipsos. Meanwhile, Ipsos allocates 16 per cent to “Independents / Others”, compared with 11 per cent in Ireland Thinks and 14 per cent in Red C.
At the level of the larger parties, the pattern continues. Red C shows Fianna Fáil at 15 per cent; Ireland Thinks at 18; Ipsos at 19. Combined Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael support appears milder in its erosion in Ipsos than in the competing surveys.
Individually, each figure falls within conventional margins of error. Collectively, they point in one direction: Ipsos records less volatility and greater satisfaction among the public with the current government.
Divergence Measured Against the 2024 Election
The pattern becomes clearer when measured against the 2024 general election baseline (approximately: FF 22, FG 21, SF 19, SD 5, Labour 5, Greens 3, PBP–S 3, Aontú 4, Independent Ireland 4, Independents/Others 14).
Table 2: Poll Results Compared to 2024 Election (Δ in percentage points)
| Party | Ipsos Δ | Ireland Thinks Δ | Red C Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sinn Féin | +5 | +1 | +5 |
| Fianna Fáil | –3 | –4 | –7 |
| Fine Gael | –3 | –3 | –3 |
| Social Democrats | +2 | +5 | +5 |
| Labour | –1 | –1 | 0 |
| Aontú | –1 | +2 | +1 |
| Independent Ireland | 0 | +2 | 0 |
| Greens | 0 | 0 | –1 |
| PBP–Solidarity | –1 | +1 | 0 |
| Independents / Others | +2 | –3 | 0 |
Red C shows classic mid-term erosion: Fianna Fáil down seven points, Fine Gael down three, Social Democrats up five, Sinn Féin up five. Ireland Thinks shows strong Social Democrat growth, Aontú and Independent Ireland gains, and a sharp fall in “Independents / Others”.
Ipsos shows movement — but dampened movement. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael decline modestly. Social Democrat growth is limited. Aontú falls relative to baseline. Independents/Others increase.
Directional Outlier Behaviour
When each poll is tested against the other two, the contrasting results become clearer. Red C deviates meaningfully on Fianna Fáil. Ireland Thinks diverges most clearly on Sinn Féin and the independent allocation. Both converge, however, on stronger insurgent growth and sharper government fatigue.
Ipsos alone diverges repeatedly — and directionally. It records:
- The lowest Social Democrat support
- The lowest Aontú support
- The lowest PBP–Solidarity figure
- The mildest combined FF/FG erosion
Outlier behaviour is not inherently problematic; any poll can sit at the edge of a range. What distinguishes Ipsos is the consistency of direction. The deviation is conservative: lower insurgent growth, smoother trends, and closer alignment to the previous baseline.
The consistency of that pattern points to methodology rather than coincidence.
Methodological Differences
The differences between the three firms are better explained by method than by bias. Ipsos relies heavily on telephone interviews at a time when fewer people communicate that way. Younger voters are harder to reach through cold calls. Politically disengaged voters are less likely to take part in live interviews. People may also change their answers when speaking to another person, rather than responding anonymously online. This sample is also more likely to include voters who are older, more settled in their party loyalties, and less inclined toward protest voting.
Red C also uses telephone interviews, but it has generally been more effective at capturing late shifts in mood and translating stated preferences into realistic first-preference outcomes. Ireland Thinks, which operates primarily online, is less exposed to interviewer effects and has often been quicker to pick up emerging changes in party support, though sometimes with greater fluctuation in its results.
These differences matter in Ireland’s current political climate. Party loyalty is weaker than in the past, switching between parties is common, and voting behaviour under STV is often complex. If a poll relies heavily on how people voted last time, it may assume more continuity than actually exists. Under STV, volatility is not an anomaly; it is part of how the system works. A model that smooths over sharp changes in sentiment is therefore likely to understate the strength of insurgent parties and the scale of mid-term dissatisfaction.
Historical Performance: A Distinctive Pattern
Recent divergence would be less significant if Ipsos’ historical record under volatile conditions were strong. It is not. The present pattern fits a longer trajectory.
In the 2011 general election — an election defined by the collapse of Fianna Fáil and an extraordinary realignment of the party system — Ipsos underestimated the scale of Fianna Fáil’s implosion in the final stretch. The magnitude of the electoral shift exceeded its modelling assumptions. Red C, by contrast, came closer to capturing the scale of the realignment in its final projections. The difference was not dramatic in headline terms, but it established an early pattern: where volatility accelerated, Ipsos lagged.
In 2016, the structural problem deepened. Sinn Féin’s momentum during the campaign was overstated in Ipsos polling relative to final first-preference results, while the fragmentation of independents and smaller parties proved difficult to model accurately. Ireland’s increasingly complex multi-party environment — characterised by weak partisan loyalty and high tactical switching — exposed the limitations of models anchored to earlier, more stable voting patterns. Red C again proved more effective at translating campaign sentiment into realistic STV outcomes.
The 2020 election was more decisive still. Late swings, turnout uncertainty, and the surge in support for Sinn Féin created conditions in which volatility was not marginal but central. Ipsos materially overstated Sinn Féin relative to final first-preference distributions and struggled to allocate undecided voters effectively in the final phase of the campaign. Red C’s final polling range more closely matched the eventual outcome, capturing both the strength of the surge and its limits. Ireland Thinks detected a directional change early but overshot the scale. By 2020, Ipsos was no longer merely cautious. It was structurally misaligned in conditions of high churn.
The 2024 general election reinforced rather than disrupted this pattern. Ipsos polling suggested greater stability for the governing parties than was ultimately reflected in the final vote distribution, with less emphasis on the scale of dissatisfaction and fragmentation that became visible on polling day. Red C’s final figures more closely reflected the degree of government erosion and the dispersion of opposition support. Ireland Thinks Again proved directionally sensitive to volatility, though with greater variance in its estimates. The divergence was no longer episodic but recurrent, and it appeared most clearly in elections marked by voter churn, protest sentiment, and low turnout. Referendums provide even sharper stress tests.
In the 2015 Marriage Equality referendum, polling correctly identified the direction of the result but overstated the margin of victory. Ipsos was among those projecting a larger Yes lead than ultimately materialised. The gap reflected a familiar difficulty in capturing late changes of mind, social desirability, and turnout.
In 2018, polling again overshot the final Yes figure in the abortion referendum. Late narrowing and residual “shy No” sentiment were imperfectly captured, particularly in interviewer-led formats where social desirability pressures are stronger.
The 2024 Family and Care referendums were more severe still. Pre-referendum surveys indicated comfortable passage for both amendments. Both were defeated decisively. Ipsos performed weakest in modelling turnout and No sentiment under conditions of low salience and differences in mobilisation. Red C again proved closer to final outcomes. Ireland Thinks displayed volatility but was directionally alert to changing voter opinions over time.
Across elections and referendums, the pattern is consistent. Ipsos performs adequately in stable environments. It struggles in volatile ones. Where protest, late movement, turnout asymmetry, and fragmentation dominate, as is increasingly the case in Irish elections and referenda, its model appears to dampen or misallocate volatility. This ostensibly cautious approach now risks becoming distortion.
Conclusion
The evidence — numerical, historical, and methodological — point toward a clear conclusion.
Ipsos is no longer merely conservative. It is structurally misaligned with a volatile Irish electorate.
It repeatedly records the lowest insurgent growth. It minimises mid-term erosion. It absorbs dissatisfaction into continuity. It performs weakest where volatility and turnout asymmetry are decisive.
Red C remains the most reliable model of electoral realism under STV. Ireland Thinks is often the earliest detector of emerging shifts in voting behaviour. Ipsos, by contrast, has become the smoothest line in an increasingly jagged political landscape.
Polling is meant to describe reality, not reassure institutions. As Irish politics fragments and volatility increases, a model designed to smooth volatility will increasingly mislead rather than inform.
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