Differences in polling among Ireland’s three major polling agencies are often treated as small methodological differences producing slightly different snapshots of the same electorate. Recent evidence suggests otherwise.
The latest national surveys from Ipsos, Red C, and Ireland Thinks do not merely disagree at the edges; they present markedly different portraits of the political landscape. The divergence is now too consistent to dismiss as noise.
The most recent vote-intention figures are set out below:
Table 1: Three Most Recent National Polls (Vote Intention %)
| Party | Ipsos | Ireland Thinks | Red C |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sinn Féin | 24 | 20 | 24 |
| Fianna Fáil | 19 | 18 | 15 |
| Fine Gael | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Social Democrats | 7 | 10 | 10 |
| Labour | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| Aontú | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Independent Ireland | 4 | 6 | 4 |
| Greens | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| PBP–Solidarity | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| Independents / Others | 16 | 11 | 14 |
The divergence is not subtle.
Both Red C and Ireland Thinks place the Social Democrats at 10 per cent; Ipsos records them at 7. Aontú reaches 5 or 6 per cent in the non-Ipsos polls, but only 3 per cent in Ipsos. PBP–Solidarity stands at 3–4 per cent elsewhere and 2 per cent in Ipsos. Meanwhile, Ipsos allocates 16 per cent to “Independents / Others”, compared with 11 per cent in Ireland Thinks and 14 per cent in Red C.
At the level of the larger parties, the pattern continues. Red C shows Fianna Fáil at 15 per cent; Ireland Thinks at 18; Ipsos at 19. Combined Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael support appears milder in its erosion in Ipsos than in the competing surveys.
Individually, each figure falls within conventional margins of error. Collectively, they point in one direction: Ipsos records less volatility and greater satisfaction among the public with the current government.
Divergence Measured Against the 2024 Election
The pattern becomes clearer when measured against the 2024 general election baseline (approximately: FF 22, FG 21, SF 19, SD 5, Labour 5, Greens 3, PBP–S 3, Aontú 4, Independent Ireland 4, Independents/Others 14).
Table 2: Poll Results Compared to 2024 Election (Δ in percentage points)
| Party | Ipsos Δ | Ireland Thinks Δ | Red C Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sinn Féin | +5 | +1 | +5 |
| Fianna Fáil | –3 | –4 | –7 |
| Fine Gael | –3 | –3 | –3 |
| Social Democrats | +2 | +5 | +5 |
| Labour | –1 | –1 | 0 |
| Aontú | –1 | +2 | +1 |
| Independent Ireland | 0 | +2 | 0 |
| Greens | 0 | 0 | –1 |
| PBP–Solidarity | –1 | +1 | 0 |
| Independents / Others | +2 | –3 | 0 |
Red C shows classic mid-term erosion: Fianna Fáil down seven points, Fine Gael down three, Social Democrats up five, Sinn Féin up five. Ireland Thinks shows strong Social Democrat growth, Aontú and Independent Ireland gains, and a sharp fall in “Independents / Others”.
Ipsos shows movement — but dampened movement. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael decline modestly. Social Democrat growth is limited. Aontú falls relative to baseline. Independents/Others increase.
Directional Outlier Behaviour
When each poll is tested against the other two, the contrasting results become clearer. Red C deviates meaningfully on Fianna Fáil. Ireland Thinks diverges most clearly on Sinn Féin and the independent allocation. Both converge, however, on stronger insurgent growth and sharper government fatigue.
Ipsos alone diverges repeatedly — and directionally. It records:
- The lowest Social Democrat support
- The lowest Aontú support
- The lowest PBP–Solidarity figure
- The mildest combined FF/FG erosion
Outlier behaviour is not inherently problematic; any poll can sit at the edge of a range. What distinguishes Ipsos is the consistency of direction. The deviation is conservative: lower insurgent growth, smoother trends, and closer alignment to the previous baseline.
The consistency of that pattern points to methodology rather than coincidence.
Methodological Differences
The differences between the three firms are better explained by method than by bias. Ipsos relies heavily on telephone interviews at a time when fewer people communicate that way. Younger voters are harder to reach through cold calls. Politically disengaged voters are less likely to take part in live interviews. People may also change their answers when speaking to another person, rather than responding anonymously online. This sample is also more likely to include voters who are older, more settled in their party loyalties, and less inclined toward protest voting.
Red C also uses telephone interviews, but it has generally been more effective at capturing late shifts in mood and translating stated preferences into realistic first-preference outcomes. Ireland Thinks, which operates primarily online, is less exposed to interviewer effects and has often been quicker to pick up emerging changes in party support, though sometimes with greater fluctuation in its results.
These differences matter in Ireland’s current political climate. Party loyalty is weaker than in the past, switching between parties is common, and voting behaviour under STV is often complex. If a poll relies heavily on how people voted last time, it may assume more continuity than actually exists. Under STV, volatility is not an anomaly; it is part of how the system works. A model that smooths over sharp changes in sentiment is therefore likely to understate the strength of insurgent parties and the scale of mid-term dissatisfaction.
Historical Performance: A Distinctive Pattern
Recent divergence would be less significant if Ipsos’ historical record under volatile conditions were strong. It is not. The present pattern fits a longer trajectory.
In the 2011 general election — an election defined by the collapse of Fianna Fáil and an extraordinary realignment of the party system — Ipsos underestimated the scale of Fianna Fáil’s implosion in the final stretch. The magnitude of the electoral shift exceeded its modelling assumptions. Red C, by contrast, came closer to capturing the scale of the realignment in its final projections. The difference was not dramatic in headline terms, but it established an early pattern: where volatility accelerated, Ipsos lagged.
In 2016, the structural problem deepened. Sinn Féin’s momentum during the campaign was overstated in Ipsos polling relative to final first-preference results, while the fragmentation of independents and smaller parties proved difficult to model accurately. Ireland’s increasingly complex multi-party environment — characterised by weak partisan loyalty and high tactical switching — exposed the limitations of models anchored to earlier, more stable voting patterns. Red C again proved more effective at translating campaign sentiment into realistic STV outcomes.
The 2020 election was more decisive still. Late swings, turnout uncertainty, and the surge in support for Sinn Féin created conditions in which volatility was not marginal but central. Ipsos materially overstated Sinn Féin relative to final first-preference distributions and struggled to allocate undecided voters effectively in the final phase of the campaign. Red C’s final polling range more closely matched the eventual outcome, capturing both the strength of the surge and its limits. Ireland Thinks detected a directional change early but overshot the scale. By 2020, Ipsos was no longer merely cautious. It was structurally misaligned in conditions of high churn.
The 2024 general election reinforced rather than disrupted this pattern. Ipsos polling suggested greater stability for the governing parties than was ultimately reflected in the final vote distribution, with less emphasis on the scale of dissatisfaction and fragmentation that became visible on polling day. Red C’s final figures more closely reflected the degree of government erosion and the dispersion of opposition support. Ireland Thinks Again proved directionally sensitive to volatility, though with greater variance in its estimates. The divergence was no longer episodic but recurrent, and it appeared most clearly in elections marked by voter churn, protest sentiment, and low turnout. Referendums provide even sharper stress tests.
In the 2015 Marriage Equality referendum, polling correctly identified the direction of the result but overstated the margin of victory. Ipsos was among those projecting a larger Yes lead than ultimately materialised. The gap reflected a familiar difficulty in capturing late changes of mind, social desirability, and turnout.
In 2018, polling again overshot the final Yes figure in the abortion referendum. Late narrowing and residual “shy No” sentiment were imperfectly captured, particularly in interviewer-led formats where social desirability pressures are stronger.
The 2024 Family and Care referendums were more severe still. Pre-referendum surveys indicated comfortable passage for both amendments. Both were defeated decisively. Ipsos performed weakest in modelling turnout and No sentiment under conditions of low salience and differences in mobilisation. Red C again proved closer to final outcomes. Ireland Thinks displayed volatility but was directionally alert to changing voter opinions over time.
Across elections and referendums, the pattern is consistent. Ipsos performs adequately in stable environments. It struggles in volatile ones. Where protest, late movement, turnout asymmetry, and fragmentation dominate, as is increasingly the case in Irish elections and referenda, its model appears to dampen or misallocate volatility. This ostensibly cautious approach now risks becoming distortion.
Conclusion
The evidence — numerical, historical, and methodological — point toward a clear conclusion.
Ipsos is no longer merely conservative. It is structurally misaligned with a volatile Irish electorate.
It repeatedly records the lowest insurgent growth. It minimises mid-term erosion. It absorbs dissatisfaction into continuity. It performs weakest where volatility and turnout asymmetry are decisive.
Red C remains the most reliable model of electoral realism under STV. Ireland Thinks is often the earliest detector of emerging shifts in voting behaviour. Ipsos, by contrast, has become the smoothest line in an increasingly jagged political landscape.
Polling is meant to describe reality, not reassure institutions. As Irish politics fragments and volatility increases, a model designed to smooth volatility will increasingly mislead rather than inform.
GRAPHICS



It is worth considering the possibility of deliberate falsification of opinion poll results as well as massive election rigging in some Irish elections.
I thought the opinion polls before the abortion referendum showed that it would be defeated. Can we get a source for those opinion polls that predicted it would pass?
No poll showed no in the lead from 1/1/2017 on at least. Ipsos was actually closer than Red C in this referendum, so it’s the main outlier in the piece.
A lot of the polls are here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-sixth_Amendment_of_the_Constitution_of_Ireland
Any analysis of Ipsos that uses data more than a couple of years old needs to take in to account that it its methodology changed significantly in 2024. It absorbed B&A then and with it B&A’s polling methodology which favoured left wing parties. The boost to those parties in Ipsos polls was immediate.
If Ipsos is still using the same methodology as two years ago and is now the pollster most unfavourable to leftist parties, as you say here, then there seems to be something more complex going on.
I think it’s their methodology mostly. Face to face and phone polling just gives a higher level of social desirability impact on polling. This was the conclusion of American pollsters when they did analysis of polling errors after the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, eg. Nate Silver has talked frequently about this.
The perfunctory and superficial analysis of the 2024 referendums is disappointing.
Detailed numbers, stats and fluctuations for everything else, but for 2024, just a single paragraph of utter dross.
What were the numbers, how did each of the firms call it, how far out were they, and is it a reasonable conclusion that, given how far out they were, that it was a concerted by them to put their fingers on the scales to push the results of the referendums in a particular direction.
And if it is a reasonable conclusion, why should we trust them in the future?
Thanks for calling my essay Utter dross.
Write your own essay then and make sure it’s of a much higher standard than I can achieve Garry.
You are a horrible little man
He has a point. Why so techy. Man up.
Post-Publishing Correction by Author:
In the “Methodology” section, I said ” Ipsos relies heavily on telephone interviews at a time when fewer people communicate that way.”
Actually Ipsos uses door to door face to face polling, as I already knew and indeed this is what I was referring to in the rest of this Ipsos paragraph, “Younger voters are harder to reach through cold calls. Politically disengaged voters are less likely to take part in live interviews. People may also change their answers when speaking to another person, rather than responding anonymously online. This sample is also more likely to include voters who are older, more settled in their party loyalties, and less inclined toward protest voting”,
which can thus remain unchanged along with the rest of the essay. I must have lost my concentration when writing this erroneous sentence, my apologies.
On retrospect, I would like to change the erroneous sentence to “Ipsos usually relies on uses door to door, face to face polling”.
Thanks to everyone for reading my essay, I had great fun writing and researching it as an amateur political enthusiast and researcher.
Le gach dea-ghuí,
Caoimhín Ó Tuathaigh