The period between 1938 and the end of the Second World War represents one of the most severe tests faced by the Irish Republican tradition in the twentieth century. It was not a period of decisive advance, nor of final defeat, but something more revealing, a moment in which a movement that retained continuity, discipline and a claim to authority was compelled to operate under conditions of serious challenges.
At the centre of this period stood the Irish Republican Army, accompanied by Na Fianna Éireann and Cumann na mBan, meanwhile Sinn Féin persisted in a diminished but symbolically important form. Together, they constituted not a unified political movement in the conventional sense, but a set of interrelated organisations, each preserving an aspect of the Republican inheritance under increasingly difficult conditions.
The Emergency did not extinguish this inheritance. However, it placed it under significant pressure.
A Movement Without Its Political Arm
By the 1930s, the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Féin had largely broken down. The departure of leading figures such as Éamon de Valera, along with much of the rank and file, into constitutional politics had left Sinn Féin organisationally weakened, while the IRA continued as an independent body, asserting both military and political authority.
This separation had significant consequences. The Republican movement no longer operated as a coordinated political-military structure. Instead, the IRA functioned largely without a viable political apparatus through which to translate its objectives into broader public support. Sinn Féin, under Margaret Buckley, maintained continuity and abstentionist principle, but lacked the capacity to direct events.
The result was a movement in which authority was asserted, but its practical expression was limited by structural conditions.
The Strategic Turn of 1938-39
The reorganisation of the IRA in 1938 and the leadership of Seán Russell marked a decisive shift toward action. In the months following Seán Russell’s appointment as Chief of Staff, the authority of the Irish Republic was transferred to the Army Council by the remaining Seven abstentionist TDs elected to the Second (All-Ireland) Dáil Éireann. This was not an abandonment of tradition, but an attempt to restore its force. Russell represented a strain within Republicanism that prioritised discipline, clarity of purpose and military initiative.
It is worth noting that by this time, many left-leaning members had departed the movement, particularly following the formation of the Republican Congress in 1934 under Peadar O’Donnell.
In the aftermath of this development, the IRA underwent a considerable ideological shift. A greater emphasis was placed on national cohesion, while some members became increasingly influenced by ideas such as corporatism and distributism. Elements within the movement were also, to varying degrees, influenced by certain contemporary European political currents and many IRA members became associated with Ailtirí na hAiséirghe.
At the same time, a number of more traditionally minded or right-leaning Republicans assumed greater prominence, including figures such as Jim O’Donovan and Patrick McGrath.
The ultimatum issued in January 1939, addressed to the British government, reflected this approach. It asserted that the IRA Army Council acted as the Government of the Irish Republic and demanded British withdrawal. When no response was forthcoming, the IRA initiated what became known as the S-Plan, a campaign of sabotage in Britain.
This was a recognisable application of an established Republican method. From Wolfe Tone to Roger Casement, Irish Republicans had sought to align their cause with the strategic difficulties of Britain. Russell’s approach was consistent with that tradition.
The difficulty lay not in the intention, but in the conditions under which it was pursued.
The S-Plan and the Problem of Control
The S-Plan was conceived as a campaign of economic and infrastructural disruption. Early operations targeted power stations, transport networks and industrial facilities. Republican sources emphasised discipline and claimed efforts to minimise civilian casualties.
Yet the conditions of operation made sustained control difficult. The Coventry bombing of August 1939, which resulted in civilian deaths, became the most prominent example. Whatever the intention, the campaign demonstrated the difficulty of maintaining a controlled application of force in a complex environment.
More fundamentally, it reflected the limits imposed by the circumstances in which it operated. Coordination was uneven, communication imperfect and operational coherence difficult to sustain under pressure. These problems were shaped both by internal limitations and by the increasingly effective security environment in which the IRA was operating.
The IRA could initiate action, but its ability to sustain and direct that action was sharply curtailed.
Alongside operations in Britain, the IRA also demonstrated its continued domestic capability, most notably in the raid on the Magazine Fort in Dublin’s Phoenix Park on 23rd December 1939, in which a significant quantity of ammunition was seized from the Free State Army in a carefully executed operation.
The Free State’s Response
The 26-County government responded to the Christmas Raid with much determination. Within a matter of days, nearly three quarters of the ammunition had been recovered.
The government led by de Valera had created a comprehensive security framework including special courts with no jury, internment, censorship and even the ordering of half a dozen executions. This framework was initially established through the Emergency Powers Act and the Offences Against the State Act of September 1939 with the outbreak of the Second World War and an increase in IRA activity. On the 3rd January 1940, the Emergency Powers Act as well as the Offences Against the State were both expanded upon to give the government in Leinster House even more authority to intern civilians.
These measures formed a system designed to assert the monopoly on force of the state which called itself Éire and to suppress any competing claim to authority. Records indicate an extensive use of internment, with over 1000 people either interned or imprisoned as a result of this legislation. In addition, both the executions of six men between 1940 and 1944 along with the deaths of Tony D’Arcy and Jack McNeela on hunger strike, demonstrate the ruthlessness with which the Fianna Fáil administration approached the threat.
The consolidation of this authority came at a cost. It involved the suppression of an alternative claim rooted in the revolutionary period as well as the curtailment of political and civil freedoms under emergency conditions. Nevertheless, the practical effect was that it substantially reduced the movement’s operational capacity.
The Six Counties and the Northern Campaign
The Republican movement during the Emergency was not contained by a single security regime, but pressed simultaneously by the government in Leinster House and by the Northern administration, each operating under distinct legal and political systems. In the Six Counties, the IRA faced a security environment shaped by Stormont, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and a deeply entrenched system of political control, which differed in form from that of the 26 Counties, but both regimes were highly restrictive in practice.
This dual pressure was made particularly clear in the case of Tom Williams, who was executed in Crumlin Road Gaol in September 1942 at the age of 19. Williams had been involved in an IRA operation in Belfast in which an RUC officer was killed. He subsequently took full responsibility for the act, and in doing so he spared five others from execution. His death became one of the most enduring symbols of the Northern campaign during the period, illustrating both the severity of the response and the risks inherent in Republican activity in the Six Counties.
The following year, in June 1943, conditions within Crumlin Road Gaol gave rise to another form of Republican resistance. Twenty-two IRA prisoners began what became known as a ‘strip strike’ for political status, refusing to wear prison uniform. Figures such as John S. S. Graham and Jimmy Steele were among the most prominent Republicans associated with the protest. The strike anticipated in important respects the later blanket protests of the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrating that such forms of resistance had earlier precedents within the Republican tradition.
These developments show that the Republican movement faced pressure from multiple systems. Both jurisdictions proved highly repressive and their interests converged in attacking the movement.
Germany and the Question of Alignment
It is pertinent that the IRA’s contact with Germany must be understood within the framework of Irish Republican strategy rather than ideology. Seán Russell and others did not regard themselves as aligned with German political doctrine. Rather, they acted within a long-standing tradition of seeking external assistance where British power might be weakened. As Russell himself insisted, he was “not a Nazi” nor “pro-German,” but “an Irishman fighting for the independence of Ireland.” This approach was not novel. Irish Republicanism had historically looked outward in moments of conflict, from French assistance in the eighteenth century to German contact during the First World War. Russell’s actions followed this pattern.
The involvement of Frank Ryan further illustrates the complexity of the situation. Ryan had fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War and his presence in Germany followed his capture and transfer rather than any voluntary realignment. His role in German-related activity was limited and not representative of IRA strategy and there is little evidence that he shaped its direction.
Taken together, these elements make it clear that the movement was defined less by ideological alignment than by a consistent national objective. Its external relationships were shaped by circumstance rather than doctrine.
At the same time, such an approach carried inherent risks. The IRA entered into relationships it did not control, in a geopolitical context it did not fully command. The perception of collaboration, irrespective of intent, contributed to intensified repression and further constrained the movement’s position.
Internal Strain Under Pressure
By 1941, sustained repression and operational difficulty began to affect the internal condition of the IRA. The “Hayes affair,” involving the interrogation of a senior figure, illustrates the strain placed upon the organisation.
The pervasive threat of informers and infiltration created conditions in which internal trust became difficult to maintain. Efforts to preserve discipline and authority under such circumstances were necessarily strained and internal cohesion was affected.
This was not unusual for an underground organisation operating under intense pressure. But it marked a significant challenge to the movement’s emphasis on unity and command.
The Associated Organisations
While the IRA’s operational capacity was reduced, the other components of the Republican movement adapted to the conditions of the Emergency.
Cumann na mBan played a central role in sustaining the movement’s social and organisational fabric. Its activities, particularly supporting prisoners, maintaining communication networks and providing welfare, became increasingly important in a context where any overt activity was restricted.
Na Fianna Éireann, though significantly affected by arrests, internment and emigration, continued to function as a means of transmitting Republican education, discipline and identity. Its contraction in scale reflected the conditions of the time rather than any abandonment of purpose.
In both cases, these organisations preserved continuity under circumstances in which expansion would be challenging to a considerable degree.
Sinn Féin and Political Continuity
Throughout this period, Sinn Féin maintained its role as a political expression of the Republican tradition. Under Margaret Buckley, it upheld abstentionist principles and provided a degree of organisational continuity.
However, its separation from the IRA limited its practical influence. It neither had any direct or indirect impact on the armed campaign nor did it offer a viable political alternative within the prevailing conditions. Its importance lay in preservation rather than in the exercise of power.
This division between military activity and political organisation had always been an issue, even since the Tan War and has always had significant implications for the movement when it arose.
A Tradition Under Constraint
By the mid-1940s, the Republican movement had been reduced in scale but not extinguished. The IRA’s capacity for sustained operation had been sharply limited by repression and circumstance. Other aligned organisations persisted, though under sustained pressure. Sinn Féin endured as a political and symbolic presence.
Yet the essential elements of the Republican tradition remained continuity, discipline and a claim to authority.
The Emergency demonstrated the extent to which the practical expression of that authority depended upon conditions beyond the movement’s control. A tradition that could assert legitimacy found its ability to translate that into sustained and effective action severely limited by the conditions of the period.
This was far from the end of the Republican tradition. However, it was a moment in Irish history in which its assumptions were tested and in which the relationship between inheritance and execution became unmistakably clear.
Share this: